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Abstract
We study the statistics of earning forecasts of US, EU, UK and JP
stocks during the period 1987-2004. We confirm, on this large data set,
that financial analysts are on average over-optimistic and show a pro-
nounced herding behavior. These effects are time dependent, and were
particularly strong in the early nineties and during the Internet bubble.
We furthermore find that their forecast ability is, in relative terms, quite
poor and comparable in quality, a year ahead, to the simplest ‘no change’
forecast. As a result of herding, analysts agree with each other five to ten
times more than with the actual result. We have shown that significant
differences exist between US stocks and EU stocks, that may partly be
explained as a company size effect. Interestingly, herding effects appear to
be stronger in the US than in the Eurozone. Finally, we study the correla-
tion of errors across stocks and show that significant sectorization occurs,
some sectors being easier to predict than others. These results add to the
list of arguments suggesting that the tenets of Efficient Market Theory are
untenable.
1 Introduction
The Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) assumes that prices reflect faithfully all
available information [1, 2]. Agents are rational and use all economic information
to form an unbiased estimate of future dividends; the price is at any instant of
time the best predictor of future prices. This hypothesis is of crucial importance
for policy making and strategic corporate decisions, and also, of course, for in-
vesting in stock markets. Arguments against this idealized view of the world are
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however mounting. The very notion of ‘information’ needs to be clarified. Is there
anything like reliable, unbiased information on which rational agents can base
their anticipations? In a complex system such as the economic world, much as
in complex systems from the physical world, tiny perturbations can cause major
disturbances, and any small imprecision can lead to a total lack of predictability
[4, 5, 6]. Any information item has to be processed and interpreted, and is at
best a very noisy indicator of future results. If information is intrinsically noisy,
then prices will also be noisy; this means that prices can wander freely within
a noise band without being clearly absurd. This relates to Black’s (somewhat
provocative) idea that an efficient market is such that prices are within a factor
two from their ‘true’ values [7]. Within this ‘noise band’, price moves are mainly
due to trading and speculation, based on gossamer information. This leads to a
short to medium term volatility much too high to be compatible with the idea of
fully rational pricing [3].
How reliable is the information available to market participants? A way to
analyze this question is to study how well market experts forecast the future
earnings of companies. In principle, all publicly available information is known
to them. Their academic education and professional training should give them
all the necessary tools to extract from this information an optimal forecast of the
future earnings of the companies they specially focus on. Ideally, these forecasts
should be unbiased and with a rather small prediction error. Since individuals are
prone to errors, misinterpretations and personal biases, a pool of specialists should
improve the situation and collectively reduce any forecasting error. Actually,
financial markets are often seen as efficient because of the aggregation, through
offer and demand, of a large number of differing opinions on the price; the final
price therefore reflecting the collective consensus of market participants.
Interestingly, the statistical analysis of security analyst forecasts is possible
using various databases, and has already been the subject of several studies in the
past (see e.g. [8, 10, 9, 11, 12]). The much debated findings are (i) the systematic
upward bias of the analysts’ predictions (over-optimism) and (ii) a herding ten-
dency between analysts. As expressed by B. Trueman, “analysts exhibit herding
behavior, whereby they release forecasts similar to those previously announced by
other analysts, even when this is not justified by their information”[8]. There are
many papers in the literature discussing the reality and significance of these find-
ings, their possible causes and their impact on the behavior of investors. The aim
of this paper is to give the results of an extensive analysis of available data con-
cerning forecasts of US, European, UK and JP stocks earnings, over the period
1987-2004. Our conclusions, summarized below, are in broad agreement with the
results reported in previous papers, but our results allow us to make more precise
statements and discuss some claims and conjectures made the literature. We also
give results that, to our knowledge, have not been discussed before, such as the
cross-sectional correlations between forecast errors.
Our main results, that we will comment later in the paper, are:
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• (i) there is an overall positive bias in the analyst forecasts, that varies
somewhat over the years – small in the mid nineties, substantial during
the Internet bubble – and systematically decreases as one approaches the
earning announcement date (ead). The relative bias is on average of 60%
a year before ead and decreases to 10% one month before ead.
• (ii) the bias is stronger on stocks not belonging to the S&P than on ones
that belong to the S&P, and stronger on EU, UK or JP liquid stocks than
on S&P stocks. Our results also clearly suggest that the bias is negatively
correlated with company size.
• (iii) the relative forecast error is on average rather large and in any case a
factor 3-10 larger than the dispersion of forecasts among different analysts!
This is a very strong hint of herding behavior. Both the forecast error and
the dispersion decrease as the ead is approached. Interestingly, the herding
behavior appears to be less pronounced in the EU than in the US, the UK
or JP.
• (iv) one year before the next earning announcement, the simple ‘no-change’
forecast (i.e the next earning will equal the last one) slightly outperforms
the analyst forecasts: it is on average less biased, and has a similar forecast
error.
• (v) there is a non trivial structure in the correlation of prediction errors,
that shows clear signs of sectorization. Some sectors appear to be easier
to predict than others, while significant intra-sector correlations between
forecast errors can be observed.
As we discuss in the conclusion, these findings are hard to reconcile, both at
the qualitative and quantitative level, with the idea of rational anticipations and
efficient markets.
2 Presentation of the data
The Institutional Brokers Estimate System provides investment professionals
with a global database of analyst forecasts of earnings per share (eps), cash flow
per share, dividends per share, and net profit per share, plus additional measures
such as sales, EBIT, EBITDA and recommendations for publicly traded corpora-
tions worldwide. Thomson Financial Datastream provides both analyst detailed
forecasts and consensus forecasts over a large period of time.
The universe from which we extract our sample is represented by 1663 US
companies, with 491 belonging to the S&P, 445 EU companies, 402 JP compa-
nies and 302 UK companies. Both real eps and consensus forecasts come from
Datastream database. On average, 10.66 analysts participate to the consensus
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on all US stocks, 16.36 on S&P stocks, 17.26 on EU stocks, 8.67 on JP stocks and
10.10 on UK ones. In order to reduce the noise due to outliers, both earnings per
share and forecasts have been restricted to values in [−10; 10], over the period
1987-2004, where data are available for all studied pools.
3 Forecast bias and forecast error
3.1 Definitions
We will study below the annual eps normalized by the price of a share, that
we will call εα, where α labels the stocks. The announced earning at time t is
then noted εα,t. The forecast made by expert i of εα,t at time t − θ before the
ead is f iα,t−θ, while fα,t−θ is the average over experts of the same quantity. The
dispersion (root mean square) of forecasts over analysts is σα,t−θ. As mentioned
above, forecasts are released every months by a pool of ≈ 11 analysts for US
stocks (averaged over stocks). The ex-post forecast bias is obviously defined as:
bα,t−θ = fα,t−θ − εα,t. (1)
The grand average of the bias for a fixed distance θ from the ead, over both
stocks and years, is B(θ); one can also study how the average bias for a fixed θ
depends on time by averaging over α for a fixed t; the corresponding quantity is
B(θ; t). The forecast error Σ is defined as 1
Σ2(θ) =
〈
(fα,t−θ − εα,t)2
〉
α,t
, (2)
and:
Σ2(θ; t) =
〈
(fα,t−θ − εα,t)2
〉
α
, (3)
where 〈..〉x denotes the average over x. Similarly, we will be interested by the
grand average of the forecast dispersion over time and stocks, σ(θ), and the year
dependent average forecast dispersion over stocks, σ(θ; t).
3.2 Forecast bias
The grand average bias B(θ) is plotted as a function of θ in Fig. 1 (left), for three
different ensemble of stocks: S&P stocks, large pool of US stocks and European
stocks. We observe that the bias is positive,2 in agreement with previous studies,
showing that analysts are on average over-optimistic about the result of compa-
nies. The bias steadily decreases as θ decreases; however, expressed in relative
1Note that since the average bias B turns out to be very small compared to the forecast
error Σ, it is irrelevant to subtract or not B2 from the following definitions.
2The error bar is 6 10−4 for S&P stocks, much smaller than the observed bias except for the
smallest values of θ.
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Figure 1: Left: The grand average bias B(θ) for S&P stocks, US stocks (including
S&P stocks) and European stocks, as a function of the time θ to ead. The
statistical error bar is of the order of the size of the symbols. Note that the bias
is smallest for S&P stocks, intermediate for EU stocks, and largest for the US
stock pool, suggesting a size effect (see Fig. 2). Right: The bias B(θ; t) for S&P
stocks, for θ = 3 months and θ = 6 months, as a function of the time t (year of
the earning announcement). Note that the bias was very small around 1994 and
2003.
terms, the bias on the forecast eps is still on the order of 10% one month before
the ead! Fig. 1 (right) shows how on average the bias for a fixed θ (3 months or
6 months), B(θ; t) depends on the year of the prediction. One sees that the bias
was very strong in the early 90’s, nearly disappeared in 1993-95 to grow again
during the Internet bubble, and is back to small values since 2003 (at least for
θ = 3 months; the bias 6 months ahead is still significant). The reasons for a
persistent positive bias in forecasts have been discussed in the past – these can
be institutional (e.g.: analysts are paid by institutions that benefit from bullish
stock markets), behavioral (e.g: positive recommendations are always easier to
publish than negative statements) or affected by positively biased informations
released by companies themselves. The decrease of bias is expected because more
and more reliable information is available as the ead is approached. If the bias is
of institutional/behavioral origin, the decrease is also expected since it becomes
more and more untenable to publish knowingly unreliable estimates very shortly
before the true number becomes available (similar results can be observed on the
UK and JP pools, with biases slightly larger than for the US one).
From the data, we can also study how the average bias depends on the size
(market value) of companies. As shown in Fig. 2 (left), there is a clear size effect:
the bias is smaller on larger size companies, probably because more people are
concerned by the results of these companies; the pressure on analysts to make
good forecasts is thus stronger. The size difference might then explain why the
bias is larger in EU than for S&P stocks; this explanation is however different
from the one proposed in [9] where the difference in bias is attributed to different
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Figure 2: Left: The grand average bias B(θ) for US stocks, for different market
values, as a function of the time θ to ead. Right: The bias for S&P stocks, for
θ = 3 months and θ = 6 months, as a function of economic sector.
regulations in the US and in the Eurozone.
We have finally studied how the bias depends on the industry sector in the
US. The result is shown in Fig. 2 (see Table I for the sector code), which reveals
that there is significant dependence of the bias on the sector. Such a sectorization
of errors will be further discussed in Section 5.
Table 1: Economics Sectors
1 Basic Materials
2 Consumer, Cyclical
3 Consumer, Non cyclical
4 Communications
5 Energy
6 Finance
7 Industrial
8 Technology
9 Utilities
3.3 Forecast errors
We now turn to the forecast error, which measures how far off, typically, the
forecast deviates from the actual eps. The result is shown in Figs. 3 and 4,
where one sees, respectively, Σ(θ) as a function of θ and Σ(θ; t) as a function of
t for θ = 3 months and θ = 6 months. One sees that (i) the forecast error, much
like the average bias, is larger on the global US pool than on the restricted S&P
pool, with the EU pool in-between; (ii) the forecast error weakly decreases with
the distance to ead, but the final (θ = 0) prediction error is still 100% to 200% of
the predicted eps – in other words, the forecast is not only systematically biased,
it is also very imprecise; (iii) the forecast error seems to have trended down over
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Figure 3: The forecast error Σ(θ) and average dispersion σ(θ) for S&P stocks, US
stocks (including S&P stocks) and EU stocks. The forecast error is smallest for
S&P stocks and strongest for US stocks. The striking finding is that the forecast
dispersion is on average 3-10 times smaller than the forecast error itself!
the years: it has on averaged decreased by a factor 5 between the late 80’s and
nowadays, with a low in the mid-nineties.
Point (i) emphasizes the size effect observed in Fig. 2: analysts dealing with
larger stocks with a wide investor base produce on average better forecasts than
on small caps. Although intuitive, this result is in contradiction with the results
of Bagella et al. [9], who report an inverse size effect, but on a smaller sample of
US stocks.3 We have therefore studied the restricted S&P sample and looked for
an inverted size effect there but with no success. In fact, small, medium and large
caps of the S&P sample have a very comparable forecast error. Hence, we have
not been able to reproduce the inverse size effect reported in [9]. The difference
might come from the selected pool of stocks, or from the treatment of errors,
outliers, etc.
It is interesting to compare the performance of analysts forecasts with the
simplest ‘no-change’ forecast, which amounts to taking last year’s eps as an
estimator of the future eps. When compared with forecasts of similar maturity
(i.e. choosing θ = 11 months), we find (see Fig. 5) that both fare very similarly
in terms of prediction error, but that the no-change forecast is significantly less
biased. The situation improves somewhat for analysts as θ decreases, as of course
expected.
3The argument put forward is that “it is more difficult to take into account the interaction of
all performance drivers for a large firm with a diversified portfolio of products”. This is however
in contradiction with the usual argument of diversification, and actually with empirical data
on the size effect on firms’ growth rate dispersion [13].
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Figure 4: The forecast error Σ(θ; t) and average dispersion σ(θ; t) for S&P stocks,
for θ = 3 months and θ = 6 months, as a function of the time t (year of the earning
announcement). Both decrease with years, but the latter is always five to ten
times smaller than the former.
1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Year
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
IBES bias
Previous Year bias
Previous Year σ
IBES σ
Zero bias
Figure 5: The forecast bias B(θ = 11; t) and forecast error Σ(θ = 11; t) compared
to the same quantity computed using last year’s eps as a predictor of the future
eps.
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4 Herding effects
The most striking content of Figs. 3 and 4 is the fact that the forecast dispersion
σ, which measures how much analysts disagree with each other, is much smaller
than the forecast error itself (we find the same result for the UK and JP pools).
Furthermore, the diversity of opinions decreases with time to ead. These two
findings strongly suggest herding effects, as has been discussed and modeled in
several previous publications [8, 12]. One could argue that a convergence of
prediction is in fact natural because all analysts are perfectly competent and all
base their judgment on the same available information, that becomes more precise
as the ead is approached. This is however incompatible with the huge amplitude
of the ex-post prediction error, which means that the information was in fact
quite ambiguous and not sufficient to allow a precise forecast. The rationality
scenario would imply that the dispersion is of the same order of magnitude as
the prediction error itself, i.e. σ ≃ Σ. The observed inequality σ ≪ Σ, on
the other hand, can only be explained by a copy-cat mechanism, whereby each
analyst progressively biases his forecast toward the average of his fellow analysts,
as documented in [8]. The reasons for this strong herding behavior have been
discussed in terms of e.g. career motivations (differences between experienced and
younger analysts can be observed [11]), or behavioral effects, illustrating Keynes’
observation that it is better to be wrong with the crowd than right against the
crowd. In that respect, the improved quality of ‘outlier’ (or bold) forecasts has
been noticed in [11].
The above observation suggests to introduce the herding ratio φ = Σ/σ. From
the data of Figs. 3 and 4, we conclude that herding is noticeably stronger in the
US, UK and JP (φ ≈ 10 for S&P stocks, φ ≈ 40 for all US stocks, and φ ≈ 20 for
JP and UK stocks) than in the EU (φ ≈ 7). The reason why EU appears to stand
out might be related to the diversity of analysts following European companies.
Indeed, we could speculate that analysts from different countries and different
backgrounds might be less prone to herding behavior.
While the dispersion of opinions is much smaller than the actual prediction
error, it is still interesting to ask if there is some correlation between the lack
of agreement between analysts and the difficulty to predict the eps. A scatter
plot of the absolute value of prediction error |bα,t−θ| and the contemporaneous
dispersion σα,t−θ is shown in Fig. 6, together with a linear regression. We find, as
expected, a positive intercept (meaning that even in the case of perfect agreement
between analysts, they still get the result wrong) and a slope larger than unity.
The correlation between the two quantities is found to be 0.46, meaning that the
lack of agreement between analysts still gives some indication of how wrong their
prediction is.
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Figure 6: Scatter plot, for all times and all stocks, of the absolute forecast error
|bα,t−θ| versus the contemporaneous dispersion σα,t−θ for the S&P stocks, and
linear regression.
5 Correlation of prediction errors
The above sections were concerned with the variance of the individual forecast
errors, which we found to be quite large. However, since we have calculated this
as a grand average over all stocks, this large error could be localized in some
sectors of activity, or some particular stocks. It is thus interesting to look at the
correlation of these forecast errors across different economic sectors. One would
a priori expect to see a ‘market mode’ and a sectorization of the forecast errors,
much as stock returns. A way to investigate systematically this question is to
study the covariance matrix Cα,β and the correlation matrix cα,β, defined as:
Cα,β = 〈bα,t−θbβ,t−θ〉t,θ − 〈bα,t−θ〉t,θ〈bβ,t−θ〉t,θ, (4)
and
cα,β =
Cα,β√
Cα,αCβ,β
. (5)
[One could also have chosen not to average over θ and have θ dependent cor-
relation matrices]. A way to analyze the content of these matrices is to study
their eigenvalues and the corresponding eigenvectors. We expect, much as like
the correlation matrix of stock returns, that a large fraction of these eigenvalues
is dominated by measurement noise and do not contain useful information, while
only the few largest eigenvalues carry meaningful information.
In order to perform this analysis, we have restricted to M = 324 stocks
from the S&P during the period 1990-2003. Using results from Random Matrix
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Theory [14], we find that only three or four eigenvalues can be distinguished
from pure noise. The corresponding eigenvectors are unlocalized, with an inverse
participation ratio on the order of M/2, meaning that a large fraction of the
stocks participate to these correlation modes.4 Theses eigenvectors corresponding
to the largest eigenvalues of c reveal that some sectors dominate, meaning that
prediction errors are strong in a some sectors and much weaker in others. Perhaps
unexpectedly, the largest eigenvector is not uniform, as one would observe if
predictions were over-optimistic or over-pessimistic for the market as a whole.
Already at the level of the largest eigenmodes shown on Fig. 7, some sectorization
indeed appears as the largest mode is not uniform over the stocks; for example,
the errors in sector 3 seem uncorrelated from the rest of the market. Remember
that in this sector the bias is also small on average, which is not surprising in
view of the relative stability of the demand in this sector (food, drinks, etc).
The first mode also shows that large, correlated prediction errors are localized in
sectors 2, 4, 6 and 7, while the second mode reveals clearly that sector 6 (Finance)
stands out as a special sector, as far as forecast errors are concerned. We have
also studied the θ dependent correlation matrices and found that the inverse
participation ratio of the top eigenvectors decrease as the ead is approached,
meaning that sectorization of errors increases as θ decreases. This is again quite
expected.
6 Additional remarks and conclusion
In this study, we have once more confirmed, on four different, large sets of data,
that financial analysts are on average over-optimistic and show a pronounced
herding behavior. These effects are however time dependent, and were particu-
larly strong in the early nineties and during the Internet bubble. We have also
emphasized that their forecast ability is, in relative terms, quite poor and com-
parable in quality, a year ahead, to the simplest ‘no change’ forecast. As a result
of herding, analysts tend to agree with each other five to ten times more than
with the actual result. We have shown that significant differences exist between
US stocks and EU stocks, that may partly be explained as a company size effect
and not, as conjectured in [9], to differences in regulations and information trans-
parency. Interestingly, herding effects appear to be stronger in the US than in
the Eurozone. Finally, we have studied the correlation of errors across stocks and
shown that significant sectorization occurs, some sectors being easier to predict
than others.
The conclusion is that if the information available to the best experts is so
4The participation ratio of a given normalized eigenvector Vα is defined as Y =
∑
α
V 4
α
. For
a uniform eigenvector, V 2
α
= 1/M and Y = 1/M , whereas for a eigenvector localized on a single
stock, Y = 1. The quantity 1/Y therefore gives the number of stocks ‘participating’ to the
eigenvector.
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Figure 7: First and second eigenmode of correlation matrix c. Note that stocks
are ordered by economics sectors. A smoothing of the eigenmode components
has been performed for clarity.
scarce and/or difficult to interpret, resulting in such imprecise and biased esti-
mates of the earnings of companies, one can really wonder what the concept of
efficient markets and rational pricing really means. The famous relation between
the price of a stock and the sum of expected (discounted) future dividends ap-
pears to be nearly empty with such gossamer information. In fact, one can test
quantitatively the validity of such a pricing equation. Since dividends are corre-
lated with earnings, a surprise in the announced eps compared to its anticipation
should lead to an immediate change of the price of the stock. If earnings per share
and dividends per share were equal, a reasonable mean-reverting random walk
model for earnings would lead to a perfect correlation between the price change
on the ead and the difference between the latest forecast and the actual eps.
There are however two complications: (i) dividends per share and eps have a
correlation ρ < 1. For S&P stocks, we find ρ ≈ 0.25; (ii) on the ead, other news
may affect stock prices. A way to estimate their impact is to measure the average
increase of volatility on eads compared to normal days. For the same pool of
stocks, we find a volatility ratio of ≈ 1.7. The resulting correlation between stock
returns on ead and the unanticipated part of the eps can then easily be com-
puted to be ≈ 0.20, a factor four larger than the empirical correlation, that we
find to be ≈ 0.05. Such a decoupling between dividends and stock prices is similar
to that reported by Shiller in his famous study on excess volatility [3]. One could
argue that the measured correlation is small because part of the information is
actually already encoded in the price, before the ead, through ‘insider trading’
[15], or through the ‘collective intelligence’ markets are supposed to be endowed
with. We have checked that this is not the case by studying the correlation be-
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tween price changes and eps changes. If the market was correctly anticipating
the change of eps, the price change between the day before the previous ead and
the day after the last ead should be positively correlated with the change of eps.
However, we found empirically a very small, insignificant correlation of 0.02. So
the announced eps should have a much stronger impact on prices, if the classical
rational pricing model was correct.
We rather believe that the notion of a true, fundamental price of a company is
moot, since nobody, even the best expert, can agree on its value. One can at best
estimate a rather broad range, say within a factor of two, of reasonable prices for
a given stock [7]. Within this range, prices fluctuate freely – arbitrage cannot be
efficient, because of the lack of a reliable estimate of what the true price should be
[16]. The volatility is then set by the trading activity itself [17, 18, 19], and can
be indeed much larger than what should be expected on the basis of the efficient
market theory [3]. Non rational, self-referential and behavioral effects do emerge
[20, 21, 16, 22, 23, 24], unleashed by the lack of reliable information, generically
unavailable in complex systems – complexity puts de facto strong limits on the
very notion of rationality [4, 25, 26]. However, as emphasized in [24], on time
scales such that these random fluctuations become of the order of 100 % and
reach the boundary of the fuzzy price range alluded to above, one should expect
mean reversion effects to become noticeable. For a typical stock with a daily
volatility of 3%, this corresponds to 1000 days (because 100 ≈ 3√1000), or four
years. Such a time scale is precisely the typical reversion time scale discovered
by De Bondt and Thaler in their paper on overreaction in stock markets [27].
Finally, the strong herding effects between analysts leaves little doubt that
similar herding effects exist between investors and market agents at large [20, 21].
This is another nail in the coffin of Efficient Markets. Efficient Markets should
reflect the aggregate opinion of incompletely informed, but independent agents,
and therefore produce a global, unbiased estimator of the true value of compa-
nies. Instead, herding effects can lead to overreactions, bubbles and persistent
mispricings, a conclusion of little surprise to the lay-man not acquainted with
neo-classical economics.
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